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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Amendment to Exempting Rule Revoking
Its Operation as to Single Company must be Preceded by an Adjudi-
catory Hearing-Pursuant to § 3 (d) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act,1 the SEC promulgated Rule U-49 (c) 2 exempting from
the requirement of its approval 3 the reorganization plans of a limited class
of subsidiary companies. 4 Pittsburgh Railways Company, a subsidiary
of the petitioner here, was within the exempted class. Eight years after
Pittsburgh had entered into reorganization proceedings and after the
Pennsylvania Utility Commission had approved its plan, SEC gave notice
of a proposed amendment to Rule U49 (c) terminating the exemption. 5
Though applicable to a class, this amendment would, in fact, revoke the
exemption only as to Pittsburgh. Interested parties were given oppor-
tunity to submit data, views and comments, and oral argument was held,
but no formal adjudicatory hearing preceded the adoption of the amend-
ment by the Commission. Upon petition for review, this "rule" was held
to be an order and invalid for lack of an adequate hearing.-Philadelphia
Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, D. C. Cir., Oct. 28,
1948.
The court based its decision primarily upon a premise that the dis-
tinction between rule-making and adjudication exists in the fact that
rules are of future and general effect while orders are immediate and
particular in their application. 6 Hence, since Pittsburgh alone was im-
mediately affected by the revocation, this was an "order" requiring ad-
judication. However, it is doubtful that the premise was so determinative
as the court assumed. There is authority to the effect that the essential
requisite of an order is that it apply to named or specified persons or
situations; 7 likewise, that it is sufficient if in its impact the agency's
action "applies specifically and affects or determines the rights of a par-
ticular person." 8 Neither of these tests gives weight to immediacy. The
Administrative Procedure Act, in turn, places regulations of either general
or particular applicability within the definition of rules,9 adopting, for
some purposes, a distinction based on whether or not the action taken by
1. 49 STAT. 811 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79c(d) (1946) empowers the Commission
to exempt companies and subsidiaries from provisions of the Act.
2. 17 CODE FED. REGs. § 250.49(c) (Cum. Supp. 1943).
3. Section 11(f) of the Act, 49 STAT. 822 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §79k(f) (1946)
requires such Commission approval for such plans.
4. Only Pittsburgh and one other company, termed the Inland Group, were such
subsidiaries as qualified for the exemption under Rule U-49(c).
5. 17 CODE FED. REGS. §250.49(c) (Cum. Supp. 1947).
6. Instant case at 9. Louisville and Nashville R. R. v. Garret, 231 U. S. 298
(1913) ; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 221 U. S. 210 (1908).
7. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNcTIONS OF NATIONAL ADINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
25 (1927); Davis, The Requirement of an Opportunity to be Heard in the AdmInis-
tratve Process, 51 YALE L. J. 1093, 1140 (1942) ; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making, 53 HARV. L. REv. 258, 265 (1938).
8. See Philadelphia Company v. SEC, 164 F. 2d 889, 900 (D. C. Cir. 1947).
This statement was based upon the holding in Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC,
316 U. S. 407 (1942).
9. 60 STAT. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (c) (1946).
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the agency is of future effect. 10 A fundamental problem of administrative
procedure is to provide hearings which permit proper consideration of
the rights of the parties concerned, and yet do not obstruct the efficient
operation of the agency."- The conflicting definitions noted above demon-
strate that categorical designation offers no solution. The distinction be-
tween "rule" and "order" has its consequence in the type of hearing
precedent to formulation. Thus, classification should properly depend
on the proceeding which seems most appropriate to a fair administrative
process in a particular situation, rather than on the effect of a proposed
regulation. A determination of such character contemplates many fac-
tors. Although each decision necessarily rests upon the particular cir-
cumstances, important considerations include the nature of the question
involved, the type of information to be adduced, the number of interested
parties, and the way in which their rights are concerned. In the instant
case, Pittsburgh was alone affected by the revocation; it had taken lengthy
and expensive steps to effect reorganization, and had made contracts an-
ticipating its successful consummation. It might be argued that this ex-
emption is primarily a question of agency policy most effectively settled
by informal hearings. However, the potential obstacle imposed by the
approval requirement, the limited scope of the question involved, and the
fact that the revocation was directed only at Pittsburgh, 2 support the
decision rendered in the instant case. It is unfortunate that the court
chose to express its result in terms which do not penetrate to the funda-
mental issues.
Administrative Law-Section 9 (b) of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act Not Applicable to FCC License Renewal Proceedings-
The Federal Communications Commission notified a broadcasting com-
pany that a hearing was to be held to determine whether its license would
be renewed in view of the doubtful accuracy of its corporate finance re-
ports. The licensee requested that the Commission conform to the second
sentence of § 9 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act' by allowing
it opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with Commission
requirements before holding the hearing. The Commission ruled that
§ 9 (b) does not apply to renewal hearings, the question therein being
whether, in view of all of the petitioner's actions during the license period,
its continued operation would be in the public interest.2 It reasoned that
to require prior notification of each violation of so general a standard
would destroy licensee responsibility and place an impossible burden of
supervision on the FCC. The Northern Corporation (WMEX), FCC
File No. BR-833, April 28, 1948.
10. See Ginnane, "Ride-Making," "Adjudication," and Exemptions Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 95 U. OF PA. L. Riv. 621, 625-27 (1947).
11. See GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS 229 (2d ed.
1947); Byse, Administrative Procedure Reform in Pennsylvania, 97 U. OF PA. L.
Rxv. 22, 50 (1948).
12. The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates a
recognition that the determination by an agency of a single individual's status under
existing law calls for adjudication. 92 CONG. REc. 5649 (1946).
1. 60 STAT. 242 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1008 (Supp. 1948).
2. Sections 307(d), 309(a) of the Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1084, 1085
(1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. §§ 307, 309 (1946).
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The original purpose of renewal hearings was to give the FCC con-
tinued power to coordinate and regulate the industry. However, the
Commission for years has used the hearings as a check on improper li-
censee conduct almost to the exclusion of revocation proceedings3 pro-
vided for by the Communications Act.4 The latter are disciplinary, being
directed at specific violations of agency requirements. By postponing ac-
tion on individual breaches of regulations until the question of license re-
newal arises, the Commission not only reduces the number of hear-
ings, but shifts the burden of proof to the petitioner, and opens the record
to an investigation of all its activities. Thus the only actual question raised
in many renewal hearings, as in the instant case, is whether a specific act
was improper. The agency's argument that § 9 (b) would impose an
intolerable burden upon it by requiring that licensees first be given an
opportunity to correct their conduct is valid as to the renewal hearings
aimed primarily at examining the company's over-all conduct. No such
burden is possible with disciplinary hearings such as that involved in the
instant case, where the alleged specific offense has already been uncovered.6
On the contrary, every reason exists for the application of § 9 (b) to them.
It was designed to protect licensees charged with unintentional violations
of agency requirements from the sudden "withdrawal, suspension, revoca-
tion, or annulment" of licenses by affording them opportunity to correct
their conduct before termination proceedings are begun.6 Disciplinary
hearings which question particular activities are in fact revocation in the
guise of renewal, and the safeguards surrounding revocation should there-
fore apply to them even though they are not expressly included by
§ 9 (b).7 By denying licensees the protection of § 9 (b) in such proceed-
ings, the FCC is reserving to itself the power to terminate their opera-
tions summarily s for unintentional violations of specific regulations. Such
a result defeats the purpose of the section.
Bankruptcy-Offer to Pay Debt With Merchandise Other Than
Creditor's Does Not Give Reasonable Cause to Believe a Preference
Is Effected-The bankrupt, a candy company, had a running account
with a grocery supply company in which it had accumulated a substantial
balance. On several occasions, the supply company had received candy
from the bankrupt as credit against this account. Within four months
3. Caldwell, L. G., Federal Communications Commission Procedure, 7 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 765 (1939). E. g., Comment, 11 Am L. Rxv. 410 (1940). The
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure recommended that the
FCC substitute revocation for renewal proceedings in censorship cases. Att'y Gen.
Comm. Ad. Proc., FCC, SEN. Doc. No. 186, 76th CONG., 3rd SEss. 80 (1939).
4. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U. S. C. §312 (1946).
5. For a collection of renewal proceedings involving false financial and ownership
statements, see Delan, Regulation and Revocation of Licenses by the FCC, pt. V, 120
N. Y. L. J. 1710, Dec. 31, 1948.
6. Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative History, SEN. Doc. No. 248, 79th
CONG., 2nd SEss. 35, 274, 323 (1946) ; Fair Administrative Procedure is Offered in
Improved Draft of Proposed Bill, 30 A. B. A. J. 6, 44 (1944).
7. See Davis, Separation of Ftctions in Administrative Agencies, pt. III, 61
HARv. L. Rav. 612, 628, 635 (1948) for a plea that the Administrative Procedure Act
be interpreted broadly so that its purposes may be effected in the wide variety of
situations for which it was designed.
8. In practice, hearings seldom result in refusal to renew. But the very institu-
tion of proceedings results in substantial damage to the licensee. See the report of
Commissioner Craven as quoted by Caldwell, supra note 3, at 775.
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of the adjudication in bankruptcy the creditor, who had no knowledge
of the existing insolvency which a subsequent audit of the books revealed,
called on the bankrupt to settle the account. When the creditor was told
that business was bad and -the bankrupt was overstocked, it agreed to
take merchandise other than its own in payment. The referee held that
this was a voidable preference under § 60 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act.'
On review, reversed, on the ground that a voidable preference results only
when the transferee has reasonable cause to believe that the transfer will
effect a preference. In re Venie, 80 F. Supp. 247 (W. D. Mo. 1948).
The Congress and the Judiciary, by continually revising the require-
ments for a voidable preference, have sought to attain a distribution of
the bankrupt's assets that is equitable to all the creditors.2 A phase in
this development has been the easing of requirements of proof as to the
the mental state of the transferee. The statute, as originally enacted,3
provided that a preference given within four months of filing of bank-
ruptcy proceedings should be voidable, if the person receiving it
. . . shall have had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended
thereby to give a preference." This section was amended in 1910, 4 so
as to read that such preference would be voidable if at the time the bank-
rupt was insolvent ". . . and the person receiving it . . . shall then
have reasonable cause to believe that the transfer would effect a prefer-
ence." In determining the proof required under this amendment, the
Supreme Court in the case of Cunningham v. Brown,5 in 1924, inter-
preted this to include a preference given a creditor who had reasonable
cause at the time to believe the debtor insolvent. The effect of this
decision was to minimize substantially the difficulty of establishing the
applicability of § 60 (b). It became the established rule," with the ex-
ception that if the recipient of the preference believed that the debtor
would be able to pay his obligations in full if allowed to continue in
business, knowledge of insolvency did not render it voidable.7 The
present provision, enacted in 1938,8 requires that the creditor ". . . have
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent . . ." Such legis-
lative affirmation of the position taken by the courts removes some of the
uncertainty inherent in the former provision. The courts, in dealing with
this proposition, have held that a creditor has reasonable cause to believe
a debtor is insolvent if aware of facts that would lead a prudent business-
man to the conclusion that the debtor is insolvent.9 In addition, if the
circumstances are such as would incite a man of ordinary prudence to
make inquiry, the creditor is chargeable with notice of all facts which a
1. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §96 (1946).
2. McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.
oF Cnr. L. REv. 369 (1938).
3. 30 STAT. 562 (1898).
4. 36 STAT. 838 (1910).
5. 265 U. S. 1 (1924).
6. Huttig Mfg. Co. v. Edwards, 160 Fed. 619 (8th Cir. 1908); In re Paul
Delaney Co., 26 F. 2d 937 (W. D. N. Y. 1928), aff'd, 30 F. 2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1929) ;
In re Eichold, 27 F. Supp. 284 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). Contra: Mansfield Lumber Co.
v. Sternberg, 38 F. 2d 614 (8th Cir. 1930).
7. In re Bressnan, 45 F. 2d 193 (D. Md. 1930).
8. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §96 (1946).
9. Boston Nat. Bank v. Early, 17 F. 2d 691, 692 (lst Cir. 1927); New York
Credit Men's Ass'n v. Chaityn, 29 F. Supp. 652 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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reasonably diligent inquiry would have disclosed. 10 Courts have stated
that an offer to return the creditor's goods, in settlement of the debtor's
account, would incite a man of ordinary prudence to investigate the
debtor's solvency, so that acceptance of the offer renders the transfer
voidable where insolvency existed." It would seem to follow that an
offer, without more, to pay with goods of another creditor, where the
offeree is aware that the debtor's business is bad and he is overstocked,
should present even stronger circumstances to provoke inquiry.
In the present case, it is clear that the court has applied law that
has long since changed. Despite this error, it seems doubtful, upon ex-
amination of the fact situation, that the transfer would have been de-
clared voidable under existing law. There had earlier occurred numerous
similar transactions; on these occasions the creditor had not found the
debtor to be insolvent. This practice seems to have been customary to
their relationship. Further, the trustee bears the burden of establishing
the requisite elements. 1 2 Under these circumstances, even the most strin-
gent decisions under the current formula do not suggest a different re-
sult; 1 nor would such a different result seem in accord with the evident
policy of § 60 (b) to protect a creditor justifiably ignorant of his debtor's
inability to meet other obligations.
Corporations-Adjustments in Depreciation Reserve Accounts
Included in Determining Dividend Credits-Defendant, a New Jersey
corporation, paid dividends in full to six per cent, non-cumulative, non-
participating, preferred shareholders for many years, accumulating a large
surplus during that period. From 1935 to 1944 reduced or no dividends
were paid on preferred shares. In several of these years, defendant had
earned a current net income, but at the same time had transferred large
sums from the surplus account to a reserve for depreciation account, the
board of directors having determined that the previous reserves were in-
adequate. In other years, however, defendant had suffered a net operating
loss, but had transferred large sums to surplus from depreciation reserve
accounts believed to be excessive. After full dividends were paid on pre-
ferred shares in 1946, the directors declared a dividend on common.
Plaintiff, a preferred shareholder, sued to enjoin payment to the common,
claiming that the certificate of incorporation entitling preferred shares to
dividends "out of the surplus or net earnings of each year," entitled him
to dividend credits determined from the surplus fund as well as from net
earnings for the years in which reduced dividends were paid, and that
such dividend credits must be distributed before any dividends could be
paid on common shares. The court decided that plaintiff had a right to
dividends for such years from either the net additions to surplus of each
10. Pender v. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 58 F. 2d 296 (2d Cir.
1932). But see Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 96 F. 2d 487, 491 (6th Cir.
1938), where the court said that mere suspicion of insolvency was not adequate to
constitute a voidable preference.
11. Abdo v. Townshend, 282 Fed. 476 (4th Cir. 1922) ; Yarm v. Whitcup, 46 F.
2d 117 (E. D. N. Y. 1931); Cole v. F. Mayer Boot Shoe Co., 167 Mass. 331, 166
N. E. 843 (1929).
12. Mansfield Lumber Co. v. Sternberg, 38 F. 2d 614 (8th Cir. 1930).
13. Cases cited note 10 supra.
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year or from current net income, but not from the surplus funds which
had accumulated in the years preferred shareholders had received their
specified preference.1 Agnew v. American Ice Co., 61 A. 2d 154 (N. J.
1948).
In New Jersey, non-cumulative preferred shares are entitled to divi-
dends from the net profits of each year, up to their specified preference,
before dividends can be paid on common.2  If in any year profits have
been earned but have been withheld from distribution, the preferred are
accorded a dividend credit up to the amount which they would otherwise
have received; this is a claim which must be satisfied before there can be
any payment of dividends to common shareholders. If they are non-par-
ticipating, preferred shares have no interest, beyond their preference, in
the earnings of any year, the balance being available for dividends to com-
mon shareholders.3 Thus, under the dividend credit theory, each class
of shares is entitled to the same portion of surplus funds it would have
received had the funds been distributed when earned.4 Clearly, adjust-
ments in depreciation reserves and in similar items affecting surplus alter
the amount lawfully available for dividends, and, consequently, the divi-
dend credits of each class of shares.5 If such adjustments are subsequently
found to have been erroneous, corrections will again affect surplus and
dividend rights. When this occurs, dividend credits calculated for prior
years in which depreciation reserves were misjudged should be correspond-
ingly adjusted, in order that the credits may reflect properly the dividend
rights of both classes of shareholders.6 The court in the instant case,
however, did not require such an adjustment; rather, it took the position
that any surplus additions or deductions affected dividend credits only
for the year in which such additions or deductions were made. Such a
decision invites manipulation of depreciation reserves and similar funds
which can be made available for dividends. For example, if non-cumula-
tive preferred shares are entitled to a $60,000 preference, and C corpora-
tion earned $60,000, but transferred $60,000 from the surplus account to
a depreciation reserve account accruing in prior years and "found inade-
quate," preferred shareholders would receive no dividends, since there
would be no funds lawfully available for distribution. If C corporation
next year earned $60,000 and $60,000 was transferred to the surplus ac-
count from a reserve account for depreciation accrued in prior years and
1. The court also decided for the first time the question of how subsequent losses
were to affect dividend rights previously accrued. The court stated that losses were
to be charged against common stock's portion of surplus. See Berle, Non-Cumulative
Preferred Stock, 23 COL. L. REv. 358, 363 (1923). But cf. Frey, The Distribution of
Corporate Dividends, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 735, 758 (1941) (Losses do not affect
dividend credits already accrued, but only eliminate the fund lawfully available for the
payment of dividends).
2. Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 96 N. J. Eq. 736, 126
AtI. 302 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924). Contra: Wabash v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197 (1930).
3. "On the other hand the corporation has no right to accumulate a reserve fund
which would otherwise be paid out as dividends to the holders of common stock and
after use it to pay dividends to the preferred stockholders, when the net profits of the
year for which the dividend is declared is not sufficient for that purpose." Bassett v.
United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 541, 73 At. 514
(Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
4. Instant case at 157. Cf. Frey, supra note 1, at 750.
5. Cf. Fitts, The Relation of Depreciation Charges to the Determination of Sur-
plus and Earnings Available for Dividends, 33 VA. L. REv. 581, 597 (1947).
6. Cf. PATON AND LITTLETON, AN INTRODUCTION To CORPORATE ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS, 110 (1940).
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believed excessive, $120,000 would be available for dividends, of which
preferred would receive $60,000 and common $60,000. Had proper ad-
justments been made in earnings for the years in which excessive or in-
adequate depreciation charges were made, preferred shares would have
correctly been given $120,000 in dividends or dividend credits.
The court sought to avoid manipulations of this character by inter-
preting the certificate of incorporation as requiring payment to preferred
shareholders of dividends either from net earnings or from additions to
surplus resulting from adjustments in reserves. In the example given,
this interpretation would entitle the preferred to the correct dividend
credit of $120,000. However, this solution offers difficulty, since it may
result in giving preferred shares a dividend credit exceeding the net earn-
ings for the year in which it is given. If, in the example above, the earn-
ings of C corporation for the second year were $30,000 instead of $60,000,
and the same adjustments of depreciation reserves were made, a correct
application of the dividend credit theory would require that the preferred
be accorded a dividend credit of $90,000--i. e. credits in each year equal
to the current net earnings, after proper corrections corresponding to
the adjustments of reserves. However, under the holding in the instant
case, the preferred shareholders would still be entitled to a dividend credit
of $120,000. Such a solution seems a distortion of the dividend credit
theory. However, the decision reflects a recent New Jersey trend towards
giving preferred shareholders undue protection at the expense of the
common.
7
Drugs and Druggists-Misleading Literature, Sent Separately,
"Accompanies" Drugs Within Terms of Pure Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act-A drug supplier sent the retail vendors of certain of his products
pamphlets which contained false statements relating to their efficacy.
These were shipped separately from, and either before or after the drugs
they described. The retailers distributed them to the consumers. The
supplier was found guilty under §§ 331 (a) and 333 of the Pure Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of having introduced misbranded drugs into in-
terstate commerce. On certiorari the decision was affirmed.1  Kordel v.
United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 106 (1948).
The claimant, who manufactured health machines, sent a customer,2
after the machines had been shipped, certain leaflets which made false
claims as to their curative value. The United States filed a libel pursuant
to § 334 of the Act, seeking seizure of the machines on the grounds that
they were misbranded when introduced into interstate commerce. Re-
solving a conflict among the circuits, the Court reversed the judgment
7. E. g., Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., 131 N. J. Eq. 460, 25 A. 2d 924
(Ch. 1942); Note, 56 HA~v. L. REv. 132 (1942).
1. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U. S. C. §331(a) (1946) prohibits the introduction
into interstate commerce of any drug that is misbranded. It is misbranded according
to § 352(a) if its "labeling is false or misleading in any particular." The term label-
ing is defined in § 321 (m) to mean "all labels and other written or graphic matter
(1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such
article." Section 333 makes the violation of any of the provisions of § 331 a crime.
2. The consignee did not receive the machines as a merchant, although he did
sell some to others.
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below and held the seizure valid.3 United States v. Urbuteit, 69 Sup.
Ct. 112 (1948).
The Act defines an article as misbranded when introduced into inter-
state commerce if misleading literature "accompanies" it.4 Refusing to
permit the defendants to evade the statute the court interpreted "ac-
company" to include the literature sent separately.5 Although the ex-
pression "accompanies the article" was not included in the earlier Pure
Food and Drug Act, it was used in a decision under that Act with
reference to descriptive matter in the package.6 Under the present Act
misleading matter attached to the article shipped is covered by § 321
(M) (1).7 A separate section deals with misleading matter accompanying
the article. 8 It may be reasonably concluded that this second section was
added in order to include misbranding matter not attached to the pack-
age. However, conceding that printed matter may accompany a drug
into interstate commerce even though it is not attached to the package,
the framework of the statute indicates that this provision should be in-
terpreted only to apply in instances where the literature and the article
are simultaneously in transit. The Act creates several offenses, each de-
pending on the relation the drug bears to interstate commerce when it is
misbranded. 9 Thus, for example, if the literature arrives while the article
is being held for sale after shipment, § 331 (k), which prohibits mis-
branding at this stage, applies. In the Kordel case, this section rendered
the defendant's activity criminal. The Court, however, recognizing that
§ 331 (k) would not be available if the misbranding matter were sent
after shipment of the articles to consignees who were not vendors, pre-
ferred, anticipatorily, to adopt a liberal interpretation of § 331 (a). In
addition, such a holding lent weight to the Urbuteit decision; at the time
when the latter case was decided, the libel provisions of the Act did not
authorize seizure if the goods were misbranded while held for sale,10
consequently the result could only be reached by a similarly broad con-
struction of "accompany." In both cases, the court sought to prevent
the appearance of a new hiatus in the extensive protection provided by
the Act, reasoning that the leaflets and the drugs had a common origin,
common destination, and were interdependent.
The Court suggests briefly that had it held that the literature dis-
seminated by these producers was not labeling, their conduct would
have fallen within FTC prohibitions against false advertising." The de-
cisions were not, in reality, concerned with whether these acts were punish-
able, but with which agency was to punish. Historically, the Food and
Drug Administration seeks to protect consumers from deceptive or non-
instructive labeling,12 the FTC, to protect competition and consumers from
3. 52 STAT. 1044 (1938), 21 U. S. C. § 334 (1946).
4. See note 1 upra.
5. Although the Kordel case involved a criminal proceeding, the Court construed
the statute as liberally as it did in the Urbuteit case, reasoning that a criminal law
should not be given technical constructions which would defeat its purpose. See
Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339 (1929).
6. Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S. 510 (1916).
7. See note 1 supra.
8. See note 1 .itpra.
9. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 693 (1948).
10. Section 334 did not even provide for the libel of goods misbranded while held
for sale after interstate shipment until June 24, 1948 when Congress amended the
section.
11. Kordel case at 110. 52 STAT. 114 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 55(a) (1946).
12. 83 CONG. REc. 10228-10230 (1938).
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false advertising.' 3  A distinction may not readily be drawn between de-
ceptive labels and false advertisements; much less distinguishable from
advertising is the activity in the instant cases. The result, therefore, seems
to extend the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration well into
the province of the FTC. This may perhaps be justified by the fact that
the very effective power of seizure is not conferred on the latter agency.
The opinions, which suggest no limitation other than "interdependence,"
premise even further extensions.
Interest-Alien Property Custodian May Not Recover Interest
From Date of Demanding Payment of Debt Owed Alien-Pursuant
to § 7 (c) of the Trading with the Enemy Act,' the Alien Property
Custodian determined 2 that respondent bank was indebted to a German
national. In a proceeding under § 17 of the Act to enforce compliance
with a turnover directive, the bank's claim of an asserted lien or set-off was
held insufficient as a basis for non-payment, and the bank was ordered
to pay the amount of the debt with interest from the date of judgment in
the district court. No interest was allowed from the date of service of the
turnover directive to the date of the judgment. Clark v. Manufacturers
Trust Co., 169 F. 2d 932 (2d Cir. 1948).
In the recent case of Rodgers v. United States 3 the Supreme Court
enunciated the rule that, in determining whether or not interest on a statu-
tory claim will be allowed the United States prior to the date of judgment
in the absence of an express provision, courts will consider (1) the legis-
lative purpose in imposing the obligation and (2) the principle that one
should be fairly compensated for the actual monetary damages occasioned
by another's wrong. Consistent with these criteria, no interest is per-
mitted on a criminal penalty 4 or analogous obligation; 5 however, where
obligations are primarily created to provide funds for government use, as
are those established by tax statutes,6 interest is allowed from the date
payment becomes due. The purposes of this legislation are to deprive
the enemy of property which might be devoted to the injury of the
United States and to grant to the United States the use of such property
in the prosecution of war 7 until disposition is made under legislative di-
rection.3 Section 17 grants jurisdiction to the district courts to order de-
livery of alien property summarily.9 The proceeding adjudicates the
13. H. R. REP. No. 1774, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 10 (1938).
1. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U. S. C. APp. §§ 1-38 (1946).
2. Vesting Order No. 5791, 11 FED. REG. 3005 (1946) vested the debt in the
Custodian. By Exec. Order 9788 the Attorney General was named to succeed to the
powers and duties of the Alien Property Custodian. 3 CoDE FED. REGS. E. 0. 9788
(Supp. 1946).
3. 332 U. S. 371 (1947).
4. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398 (1920).
5. Rodgers v. United States, 332 U. S. 371 (1947).
6. Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261 (1913).
7. Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F. 2d 644 (2d Cir. 1945). 40 STAT. 415 (1917),
tas amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5(b) (1946), states, ". . . such . . . property shall
be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of
and for the benefit of the United States . . ."
8. 40 STAT. 423 (1917), as amended, 50 U. S. C. A i,. § 12 (1946).
9. Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U. S. 554 (1920).
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right to possession and may not be delayed by adverse claims.10 Adequate
remedy is afforded a claimant for the return of erroneously seized prop-
erty.:" Money paid on demand of the Custodian is deposited in the
Treasury,'2 and an equivalent sum is to be paid the claimant should he
be successful in a proceeding for recovery of the sum paid.
Since the debt was vested in the Custodian and the alien obligee,
being in Germany, was unable to reach it, the primary object sought in
demanding payment from the bank may be said to have been to secure for
the United States the use of funds to which the government was entitled
by statute. Applying the considerations suggested in the Rodgers case,
it would seem that this is a situation calling for interest payable from the
date of service of the turnover directive. The protection afforded in the
event a demand is erroneously enforced precludes injury from exaction of
this interest. On the other hand, the decision in the instant case not only
denies the United States the full benefit of the money, but also encourages
wrongful retention by a creditor who can profit from its use while waiting
for the government to bring an action to obtain payment.
Public Utilities-License Fees From Affiliate to Holding Com-
pany for Services Put on a Cost Basis-Applicant, Pacific Bell Tele-
phone Co., is an operating company in which AT&T holds 86.6% vot-
ing control. Since 1880 there has been a contract under the terms of
which AT&T supplies certain services to Bell in return for a set per-
centage of the latter's gross revenue (now 1Y2 per cent).' In this pro-
ceeding Bell sought a rate increase including, as in the past, the license fee
as part of operating expense, above which there must be a fair return to
the company. The commission held that since AT&T dominated the
applicant, the standard in measuring operating expense should be the
cost of the service, to which the present arbitrary basis of calculation
was unrelated.2  The contract was disregarded and the allocated cost set
by the commission staff adopted. The commission then issued an order
to show cause why Bell should not be ordered to refrain from making
10. Ibid.
11. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), as amended, 50 U. S. C. Ap. § 9 (1946).
12. 40 STAT. 423 (1917), as amended, 50 U. S. C. Ap'. § 12 (1946).
1. There are 21 operating companies dividing the nation geographically, all con-
trolled by AT&T through stock ownership. AT&T is an interstate concern not sub-
ject to local regulation. It has made the above contract with all its subsidiaries. In
1902 the fee was set as 4Y2 per cent. It has since been progressively reduced. Re
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 P. U. R. (N. s.) 100, 108 Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n (1948) ;
Note, Direct Regulation of the AT&T, 48 YzAx L. J. 1015, 1016 (1939). The serv-
ices provided are, in general: (a) development and research; (b) use of patents; (c)
engineering and operations aid and advice; (d) accounting and financial help; (e)
legal aid; (f) advertisement. Also included is a sum entitled "funds held available"
for the use of the local companies when in need. It is generally admitted that the
services are of some value. GRONINGER, PuBLIc Uwm.Ty RATE MAKING, 191-200
(1928) ; Note, Regulation of Contracts with Holding and Affllated Companies, 9 N.
C. L. REv. 463, 464 (1931).
2. Principal case at 15.391.01. It is pointed out that the license fee for the Califor-
nia area has increased from $1,245,000 in 1937 to $2,821,000 in 1946. The rate increase
requested would increase it by $600,000 with no corresponding increase in the service
rendered.
RECENT CASES
any payments under the contract.3 In re Pacific Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. CCH UTIL. LAw REP. ff 15,391 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n. 1948).
Contracts between public utility holding companies and their subsidi-
aries have caused governmental concern for many years. Some of
the problems have been resolved by the Public Utilties Holding Company
Act of 1935,4 forbidding such contracts or putting them on a cost basis.
However, AT&T is not subject to the act. Early decisions refused
to look beyond the corporate entities involved, holding that while such
agreements should be closely scrutinized, they should not be disturbed
so long as the charge was reasonable and less than could be obtained
elsewhere.5 Southwest Bell Tel. Co. v. PSC of Mo.,6 went further,
requiring a showing by the commission of bad faith to upset the con-
tract. This rule was generally followed, and, as the state commis-
sions had no access to the books of AT&T, resulted in a blanket
indorsement of the agreement.7 Later decisions pierced the corporate veil
and treated the relationship of the companies realistically, recognizing that
the dealing was not at arms length.8 The 1930 case of Smith v. Ill. Bell
Tel. Co.,9 required the commission to allocate the cost of the services to
each Bell system, placing the burden of showing the reasonableness of
its charges on the company. However, though a cost basis is generally
recognized, 10 the methods of determination vary. Some tribunals accept
the percentage fee if it is reasonable in view of the cost," others rely on
the cost to AT&T of furnishing the services, allocated to the various
Bell systems in proportion to the amount of business done,1 some on the
3. The order is at this time before the Commission for hearing.
4. 49 STAT. 803 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79 (1946), forbids service contracts between
holding companies and their affiliates without special permission. Contracts if based
on cost are permitted between "mutual service" companies or between subsidiaries.
Note, The Servicing Function of Public Utility Holding Companies, 49 HAav. L.
REv. 957, 989 (1936).
5. City of Huston v. Southwest Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 259 U. S. 318 (1921).
6. 262 U. S. 276 (1923).
7. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Moynihan, 38 F. 2d 77 (N. D. Ill. 1930) ; Northwest Bell
Tel. Co. v. Spillman, 6 F. 2d 663 (D. Neb. 1925); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 300 Fed. 190 (D. Ind. 1924). State commissions took varying
views here. (a) Upheld the contract and allowed the charge as operating expense:
Federation of Citizens Ass. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1924D] 152
(D. C. Public Utility Comm'n). (b) Disapproved the contract without a showing
of cost to the parent, but allowed the charge under the good faith rule: In re South-
west Bell Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1921B] 516 (Ark. Corp. Comm'n); In re Ind. Bell
Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1922E] 46 (Ind. Public Service Comm'n). (c) Refused to allow
the charge without evidence of cost to the parent and at a reasonable rate: In re
Tucson Gas Electric Light & Power Co., P. U. R. [1922C] 658 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n) ; it re So. Cal. Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1922C] 97 (Cal. R. R. Comm'n) ; In re
Pacific Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1919D] 345 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n). There is an
extensive listing of these commission decisions in 1 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 and
n. 3-6 (1933).
8. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of W. Va., 278 U. S. 322
(1929) ; United Fuel Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm'n of Ky., 278 U. S. 300 (1929) ; People
ex rel. Potter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 246 Mich. 198, 224 N. W. 438 (1929).
9. 282 U. S. 133 (1930).
10. Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Kansas, 285 U. S.
119 (1932); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Odell, 45 F. 2d 180 (S. D. Mich. 1930). But
many jurisdictions retain the older view. In re Mountain State Tel. Co., 74 P. U. R.
(N. s.) 36 (Mont. R. R. Comm'n 1948).
11. Southern Bell Tel. Co. v. Tennessee R. R. and Pub. Util. Comm'n, 74 P. U. R.
(x. s.) 150 (Tenn. Ch. 1948).
12. In re Wis. Tel. Co., 28 Wis. R. C. R. 351 (1925).
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market price,13 and a few on the itemized cost of each service rendered
the individual companies. 14 Occasionally, state statutes require prior com-
mission approval of such agreements.15 The dangers of the percentage
contract are manifest.' 6 If the charge is passed on to the consumer as
an operating expense, the holding company profits from services rendered,
in effect, to itself. The fee bears no relation to the cost of services ren-
dered; a rate increase raises the contract revenue without a correspond-
ing increase in service.1 7  Furthermore, the greater revenue from the con-
tract raises the operating expense which in turn predicates another ad-
vance in rates. Of the various methods of computation adopted in the
trend towards a cost-of-service standard, that applied in the instant case
seems the most practical. To require an itemization of costs imposes
too great an accounting burden in view of the generalized character of the
services.' 8 Alternatively, the market value basis is not feasible in a
monopoly field. The California Commission, on the other hand, by de-
manding allocation to the cost to AT&T among the Bell systems, neither
inflicts an undue accounting burden, nor fails at least to approximate the
true operating expense. The result may not always be equitable, since,
with 49 commissions allocating cost, it is improbable that the total will
coincide with the actual cost to the parent. Also, since AT&T is not
subject to state regulation, the local commissions are without access to its
books, and thus, in a poor position to determine the reasonableness of its
charges. The final solution may lie in uniform federal regulation of the
telephone system.
Radio and Television-Petition Requesting Breakdown of Lump
Sum Consideration for Multiple Broadcast Properties Denied by FCC
-A Federal Communications Commission regulation requires, as a con-
dition precedent to its approval of a voluntary transfer of broadcast prop-
erties, the insertion of an advertisement in a local newspaper which sets
out in full the terms and conditions of such transfer and indicates that
any interested person may file a competitive application with the Commis-
sion on the same conditions. The Commission is then empowered to
select from among such applicants, including the proposed transferee, the
person it deems best qualified to hold the license, if transfer of control
to such applicant would otherwise be in the public interest.' After com-
plying with this regulation, the transferor and transferee in the instant
13. In re New England Tel. Co., P. U. R. [1925E] 739 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Util.).
14. In re Pacific Tel. Co., 73 P. U. R. (r. s.) 100 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1948); City of Poison v. Public Utilities Consolidated Corp., P. U. R. [1929E] 557
(Mont. R. R. Comm'n).
15. N. Y. PuB. Stov. LAW § 110(3) ; PA. STAT. AwN., tit. 66, § 129(c) (Purdon,
1936).
16. 42 P. U. FoRT. 41 (1948) ; N. Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1948, p. 4f, col. 2. The
principal case appeared shortly after resolutions adopted by various conferences of
public utilities commissioners, urging abolition of the percentage contract, and adoption
of direct charges at cost for actual services rendered.
17. See note 2 supra.
18. In re Pacific Tel. Co., 73 P. U. R. (N. s.) 100 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1948).
1. 47 CoDE FED. REGS. § 1.321 (Supp. 1946).
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case sought approval of a "package" sale of properties 2 involving two
radio licenses and one television permit.3 Petitioner, desirous of com-
peting only for the television permit, intervened contending that, properly
construed, the above rule required that the lump sum consideration be
apportioned to each of the individual components in order that separate
applications might be entered for each of the properties. Rejecting this
interpretation, the Commission ruled that there had been full compliance
with the provisions of the regulation and ordered approval of the trans-
fer application. Dorothy S. Thackrey, FCC Docket No. 2284, Oct. 28,
1948.
The Communications Act of 1934, creating the FCC and defining its
powers and duties, provides, inter alia, that no license or permit granted
by the Commission shall be transferred ". . . unless the Commission
shall, after securing full information, decide that said transfer is in the
public interest, and shall give its consent in writing." 4 Under this general
provision, and in accordance with its rule-making power,5 the Commission
promulgated the above-mentioned regulation following its decision in the
so-called AVCO case.6 The "AVCO rule" was intended to subject trans-
fers of licenses (or permits) to the same competitive forces involved in
their original issuance by a process enabling the Commission to select as
a licensee a person who was the best qualified of all applicants, rather
than one who merely met a minimum public interest standard. In view
of the fact that the transfer of the radio license in that case was merely
ancillary to the sale of a multi-million dollar manufacturing corporation,
the Commission further stated-although this was not incorporated di-
rectly into the AVCO rule-that in the future it would require separation
of consideration when broadcast properties were commingled with sub-
stantial amounts of non-broadcast properties.7 This policy was designed
to implement the theory of competition underlying the Communications
Act by encouraging applications from potential licensees who would other-
wise be precluded from competing for a license by a prohibitive overall
consideration." The same rationale would appear to support the position
taken by the petitioner in the instant case, since it is the size of the lump
sum consideration which narrows the competitive field, not the broad-
cast or non-broadcast nature of the properties. While numerous transfer
applications involving two or more licenses or permits have been approved
2. The amount involved was slightly in excess of one million dollars.
3. Transferor owned the entire amount of capital stock of the two corporations
actually holding the licenses. One of these, holder of a single radio license, was
located in San Francisco; the other, holder of the other radio license and the television
construction permit, was located in Los Angeles.
4. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 310(b) (1946).
5. 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 303(r) (1946), as amended, 50 STAT. 190
(1937), 47 U. S. C. § 303(r) (1946).
6. Powel Crosley, Jr., 11 F. C. C. 3 (1945).
7. While other broadcast properties consisting of international and relay stations
were also part of the Crosley properties, the nature of the latter and the extensive
Governmental control over the former at that time would seem to vitiate any conten-
tion that the Commission ruled on this point by its silence and by not requiring a
further breakdown.
8. This was reaffirmed in 1947 in a sale of newspaper and broadcast properties by
the Herald Publishing Company, licensee of Station WALB, Albany, Georgia. Here
the Commission required a separate valuation to be placed on the radio station in
order that competitive applications might be filed for such station without regard to
the newspaper assets involved.
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since the AVCO case,9 the only decision resting squarely on the point in
issue here grew out of the Commission's refusal to order a separation of
consideration for AM and FM facilities in the same city.'0 Standards
developed in cases involving the present closely associated AM and FM
stations should not result in curtailing competition for licenses in the new
and rapidly developing field of telecasting." Furthermore, except in the
distinguishable case noted above, the Commission has never affirmatively
enunciated a policy of refusing to require a breakdown of consideration
in multiple-license transfers.' 2  In addition, the rule making provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act ' 3 do not seem a barrier to adoption of
the construction urged by petitioner, since they do not force agencies to
forego interpretations and eschew changes in policy which will insure
the most equitable result, especially when former practices have not been
directly embodied in the terms of an existing rule.
Even conceding that the instant case correctly interpreted the AVCO
rule, it seems clear that the rule should be modified to require all future
transfer applications to state the amount of consideration attributable to
each license or permit. Doubtless such a change would impose a heavy
burden on owners of extensive broadcast interests when they desire to sell,
but this result is certainly preferable to eliminating from competition those
who are unable to command increasingly large aggregations of capital.
Moreover, under the present procedure, the Commission not only must
choose from among the small number of competitors who are able to
match the lump sum consideration, but it is also forced to decide whether
the transfer of an entire chain or block of stations is in the public interest,
manifestly a less efficacious method than one based upon a station-by-sta-
tion determination.
Trade Regulation-Stabilization of an Existing Price is Not
Manipulation Under the Commodity Exchange Act-Defendant grain
speculators, in order to protect the value of their holdings, prevented two
9. E. g., transfer of control of Stephens Broadcasting Co., licensee of WDSU
and permittee of WDSU-FM and WDSU-TV, New Orleans, Louisiana, to Inter-
national City Broadcasting Service, Inc. on October 21, 1948. However, none of these
transfers required the Commission to express an affirmative opinion with respect to
the point in issue here. Also compare the transfer of Stations KTKN and KINY,
Alaska, and the lease of Stations WMTW, Portland, Maine, and WAAB, Worcester,
Massachusetts, where the Commission required a separation of consideration; these
are dismissed by the Commission with the following statement in its opinion in the
instant case: "Although the Commission has in some instances in the past requested
the parties to combination sales of broadcast facilities to separate the properties, in
other cases (more numerous in number) no such separation has been requested."
10. Beacon Broadcasting Co., 4 PiKE & FIscHER R. R. 417 (FCC 1948).
11. In this regard the limited number of frequencies available for this medium
constitutes an additional differentiating factor.
12. This would seem to follow from the negative implication of the following
statement from the opinion in the instant case: "Moreover, re-examination of the
problem reveals that there is no Commission rule, decision, or formal interpretation
or policy statement which requires that broadcast properties be separated from other
broadcast properties to enable the filing of competing applications for one or more of
several properties being simultaneously transferred or assigned."
13. 60 STAT. 237, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1946), subjects the Commission
to the provisions of the Act. Sections 3(a) and 4(a) provide for rule making.
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million bushels of distress rye 1 from being dumped on an already de-
clining market.2 At an administrative hearing, defendants were found
guilty of having attempted to corner and manipulate the price of rye
futures 3 and actual rye on the Chicago Board of Trade in violation of the
Commodity Exchange Act.4  Upon review, the Court of Appeals held
that an attempt to stablilize or peg an existing price arrived at by natural
forces does not constitute an "attempt to manipulate" within the mean-
ing of the Act. General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F. 2d 220 (7th Cir.
1948).
Commodity exchange transactions fix the prices of the principal
agricultural products for all of the United States.5 Through surveillance
by the Commodity Exchange Commission and the prohibition of prac-
tices which might abnormally influence price, the Act seeks to make price
a reflection of supply and demand, a resultant of, rather than a reason for
exchange transactions.6 "Manipulation," although condemned in the Act
itself as an abnormal influence,7 has not, as there used, been judicially
construed. But in analogous fields it has been subjected to judicial as
well as legislative definition. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., characterized and condemned stabilization as a
form of manipulation which is sometimes manifested as "a brake on
market prices . . . a factor which prevents the determination of those
prices by free competition alone." 8 Section 9 (a) (6) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 includes within the term "a series of transac-
tions . . . for the purpose of pegging, fixing, or stablizing the price." o
The court in the instant case, however, purported to distinguish between
stabilization of an artificially enhanced or depressed price and stabilization
of an existing price resulting from natural forces, and held that whereas
the former is, the latter is not manipulation. Such a distinction may
in fact be possible, but its legal significance does not necessarily follow.
On the contrary, it would seem that an artificially maintained price, regard-
1. The term distress is commonly used to signify a commodity, usually in surplus,
which, when dumped on the market, irrespective of demand, will tend to depress
prices. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 171 (1940); Ap-
palachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 363 (1933).
2. See CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, ANNUAL REPORT OF TRADE AND COMMERCE OF
CHICAGO 64, 65 (1944).
3. See HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS IN
THE UNITED STATES 254-276 (1932). A future is a contract entered into on an
organized market to deliver grain at a definite price during a specified future period.
Offsetting purchases or sales of the same future obviates the necessity of actual
delivery.
4. 42 STAT. 998 (1922), as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1946). Section 6(b)
confers upon the Secretary of Agriculture authority to regulate dealings on commodity
exchanges, to fix reasonable limits upon the amount of future trading and open con-
tracts that may be carried on by any person, and to impose enumerated sanctions upon
persons, whom, after hearing, have been found to have attempted to manipulate the
market price of any commodity. Section 9 makes it a misdemeanor to manipulate or
attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity.
5. SEN. REP. No. 871, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1922).
6. See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 39 (1923).
7. See 42 STAT. 999 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 5 (1946), for legislative fact finding
to this effect. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, supra note 6, at 10, 12.
8. 310 U. S. 150, 223 (1940).
9. 48 STAT. 889 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §78i(a) (6) (1946). The SEC permits price
stabilization of new issues because of conditions and needs peculiar to the business of
raising capital. NASD. SEC Release No. 3700, June 13. 1945, 2 CCH FED. SEc.
L. SmR. 123,141.12 (1945). See also, Statement of the Commission, Regulation of
"Pegging, Fixing and Stabilizing of Security Prices," Release No. 2446, Mar. 18,
1940, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. SEr. 22,578 (1944).
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less of what it was originally, becomes, as a result of such maintenance,
an artificial price.
The peculiar susceptibility of commodity exchanges to manipulative
practices has prompted many state regulatory statutes; 10 the Commodity
Exchange Act, in effect, makes more explicit for this field the desidera-
tum of the anti-trust laws-preservation of competition. The decisions de-
termining the legal status of price-fixing schemes under the whole body
of federal anti-trust legislation are not in entire accord. Flexibility is the
thesis of the two leading cases in which the Supreme Court inquired into
the reasonableness of the scheme at issue, indicating a disposition to ap-
prove price-fixing although not expressly so doing." That the judicial
pendulum has swung consistently toward definiteness, is evidenced by de-
cisions which condemn all price-fixing as unlawful per se.12  The earlier
Chicago Board of Trade case gives only slender support to an inquiry into
the reasonableness of the instant scheme; in both cases the prices which
the defendants sought to stabilize were arrived at competitively.'I But the
restrictive practice which was sustained in Chicago Board of Trade v'.
United States was found by the Court to be in furtherance of orderly
exchange procedure, 14 whereas here the Court of Appeals justified the
scheme as necessary to protect the market position of the price-fixers
themselves. Furthermore, although the Act permits "hedging" as the
proper method of insuring against loss due to market fluctuations,15 de-
fendants concededly preferred to speculate. 16  In further distinction of
this scheme from those which have been held reasonable, it was admittedly
not designed to correct a chronic market condition 17 or to revive a fail-
ing industry,'8 but solely and directly to affect prices.'" Those factors press
strongly toward condemnation per se. The policy of the Commodity Ex-
change Act calls for the prevention of transactions designed primarily
to affect prices, and only a strong public interest can justify judicial inroads
upon it. This court has apparently substituted for the public interest the
self-preservation instincts of a coterie of speculators.
Wills-Anti-contest Condition Forfeiting Shares of Non-contest-
ing Beneficiaries Held Invalid-The testator devised his property
among his several children and the minor children of one daughter not
10. See statutes collected in Hoffman, Government Regulation of Exchanges, 155
ANNALS 39 (1931).
11. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918) ; Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344 (1933).
12. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927) ; United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., mpra note 1.
13. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, mspra note 11, at 239.
14. Id. at 240, 241.
15. Although hedging is desirable, excessive speculation is forbidden. 49 STAT.
1492 (1936), 7 U. S. C. § 6a (1946). See Huebner, The Insurance Service of Coln-
nmdity Exchanges, 155 ANNALS 1 (1931).
16. Brief for Appellees pp. 10, 11, General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F. 2d 220
(7th Cir. 1948).
17. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, stpra note 11, at 240.
18. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, supra note 11, at 372.
19. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra note 1. See also language
pertaining to the conjectural effect upon prices of the schemes in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, sUpra note 11, at 246; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
supra note 11, at 373-375.
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named as a beneficiary. He provided that should his will be contested
by anyone of his children or named grandchildren, the shares of all the
beneficiaries, contesting and non-contesting, would thereby be forfeited
to the executrix-daughter. Probate of the will was contested unsuccess-
fully by the excluded daughter and the order admitting the will to probate
was affirmed on appeal. In a subsequent action brought by a named bene-
ficiary1 against the executrix, the latter counterclaimed that she had be-
come sole owner of the property by operation of the anti-contest provision
in the will. The court upheld the contention of the executrix. Alper v.
Alper, 60 A. 2d 880 (N. J. Ch., 1948).
Generally courts have upheld anti-contest provisions carrying a for-
feiture clause in order to effectuate the expressed intent of the testator.
2
However, judicial abhorrence of forfeitures has caused such anti-contest
provisions to be held ineffective as against infants, 3 in case of bequests
of personalty,4 in proceedings to construe a will,5 where the contestant has
probable cause,6 and in several other instances. 7 The important question
presented by anti-contest clauses is whether public policy forbids giving
effect to the intent of the testator though clearly expressed.8 Some courts
maintain that a testator has a right to prevent matters concerning his
private life from being publicized in a contest, and his estate from being
squandered in litigation.9 Other courts contend that the forfeiture clause
in anti-contest provisions prevents any fraud or crime from being brought
to light, since the only parties who could furnish evidence of such wrong-
doing will refrain from contesting for fear of losing their benefits.' 0 A
few American courts follow the leading English case of Cooke v. Turner"
which takes the rather extreme view that there is no public policy that
either favors or opposes such contests. In cases involving the more
common and frequent factual situations it is the contesting party who
1. This action was brought by a son of the testator on the theory that this pro-
vision in the will was in effect an attempted inter vivos conveyance from testator to
the executrix which was void because of undue influence. By agreement issue was
joined as to the validity of the anti-contest provision.
2. Barry v. American Security and Trust Co., 135 F. 2d 470 (D. C. Cir. 1943);
Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N. E. 882 (1928) ; In re Chambers, 322 Mo. 1086,
18 S. W. 2d 30 (1929) ; In re Kirkholder, 86 Misc. 692, 149 N. Y. Supp. 87 (Surr.
Ct. 1914).
3. Bryant v. Thompson, 59 Hun 545, 14 N. Y. Supp. 28 (5th Dep't 1891).
4. The validity of a forfeiture of personalty has been denied in the absence of an
express gift-over. Whitehurst v. Gotwalt, 189 N. C. 557, 127 S. E. 582 (1925);
Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446 (1897). Contra: In re Hite, 155 Cal.
436, 101 Pac. 443 (1909) ; South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. Johns, 92. Conn. 168, 101
At. 961 (1917); Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N. W. 253 (1929).
5. Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A. 2d 758 (1944) ; Unger v. Loewy, 202
App. Div. 213, 195 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1st Dep't 1922).
6. The leading case is In re Friends Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Att. 853 (1904).
7. As to what acts -will not constitute a contest, see In re Hill, 176 Cal. 619, 169
Pac. 371 (1917) ; Woodward v. James, 44 Hun 95 (N. Y. 1887) ; Chew's Appeal, 45
Pa. 228 (1863).
8. Goddard, Forfeiture Conditions in Wills as Penalty for Contesting Probate, 81
U. OF PA. L. REv. 267, 279 (1933). Notes, 39 HARv. L. REv. 629 (1926), 3 WAsH.
L. REv. 45 (1928).
9. This is the policy argument advanced by those jurisdictions upholding anti-
contest clauses. For a summary of these jurisdictions, see Barry v. American Security
and Trust Co., 135 F. 2d 470 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
10. See Mr. Justice Miller dissenting in Barry v. American Security and Trust
Co., 135 F. 2d 470, 473 (D. C. Cir. 1943) ; authorities cited note 8 supra.
11. 15 M. & W. 727, 153 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1846). See Rogers v. Law, 66
U. S. 253 (1862) ; Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N. W. 202 (1909).
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forfeits his own benefits under the will.' 2 The instant case is apparently
unique in that the forfeiture clause allowed the contestant, who had no
rights under the will, to deprive all the named beneficiaries of their
benefits.' 3  Thus even if the extreme view of upholding all forfeitures
be adopted, 14 still there appears no principle or authority for upholding
a provision of this nature. Since the normal forfeiture provision repre-
sents an attempt by the testator to deter contest and to punish violators
of his wishes, the courts have upheld it on that basis. The provision in
the instant case tends in no way to effectuate the desires of the testator;
on the contrary the tendency is to encourage collusion between the party
excluded and the party that would benefit by the forfeiture.
This case reflects the confusion that has permeated this field of law,
largely due to the fact that results have often been reached on unsound
distinctions and doubtful precedents. 15 A possible solution to the prob-
lem may perhaps be obtained through legislative action providing for
statutory limitations on the testator's expressed intent. At least one state
has enacted a statute making void all anti-contest conditions in wills.'
6
However, such blanket restriction does not seem warranted because a
statute of this type while it produces certainty, fails to allow the testator's
express intent to operate to the extent consistent with public policy. Per-
haps a better statutory standard would be one which allows enforcement
of anti-contest clauses, but provides that the contestant can only forfeit
his individual benefit, but in no way disturb the rights of other beneficiaries.
12. This is the normal situation; the unusual situation of the instant case does not
seem to have been contemplated by the authorities. There are, however, a few cases
where non-initiating beneficiaries who participated in the contest in some manner have
been held bound by the forfeiture clause. The weight of authority holds anti-contest
clauses inapplicable as to the non-initiating beneficiaries. See Lobb v. Brown, 208
Cal. 476, 281 Pac. 1010 (1929); Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A. 2d 758
(1944) ; Girard Trust Co. v. Mueller, 125 N. J. Eq. 597, 7 A. 2d 413 (Ch. 1939) ;
In re United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 134 Misc. 791, 236 N. Y. Supp. 518 (Surr.
Ct. 1929).
13. Perry v. Rogers, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 594, 114 S. W. 897 (1908) is the nearest
case in point, but is distinguishable on the ground that the contestants were bene-
ficiaries of the will. An anomalous situation exists in Pennsylvania, where one line
of reasoning is applied in situations where the widow elects to take against the will
contrary to the forfeiture clause, and an opposite approach, in all other situations
where there are anti-contest clauses. In the former case, the result is to uphold the
proviso on the ground that the widow's right of election to take under the will is a
condition precedent to the beneficiaries' participation in the estate. E. g., In re
Alexander's Estate, 341 Pa. 471, 19 A. 2d 374 (1941). The opposite view does not
result in a forfeiture if the contestant has probable cause on which to dispute the will.
In re Friends Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 Atl. 853 (1904).
14. In re Howard's Estate, 68 Cal. 2d 9, 155 P. 2d 841 (1945) ; Rudd v. Searles,
262 Mass. 490, 160 N. W. 882 (1928) ; Schiffer v. Brenton, 247 Mich. 512, 226 N. W.
253 (1929).
15. E. g., South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 92 Conn. 168, 101 Atl. 968
(1917).
16. IND. Am. STAT. § 7-501 (Bums, 1933).
